Greg Detre
Monday, 22 May, 2000
for Tasioulas Mill IV
Griffin � Wellbeing part 2 - Measurement
V - Are
there incommensurable values?
Moral
incommensurables and prudential incommensurables
Forms of
incommensurability (a) Incomparability�
Is
well-being the sort of thing that can be mesaured at all?
An ordinal
scale of well-being
What powers
of measurement do we actually need?
VII - The
case of many persons
The link
between conceptions of well-being and problems of comparability
A natural
proposal for comparability and a problem with it
Interpersonal
comparisons of well-being
Intrapersonal
intertemporal comparisons
Comparability
on a social scale
quantitative language to talk of well-being, e.g. �more� or �less�
but how seriously do we have to take the idea of quantativeness to maximise well-being
we only need to know: do our powers of measurement of well-being match our demands?
well-being = the fulfilment of informed desire
what if you want a certain amount of one thing more than any amount of another � no increase in this second kind of value can overtake a certain amount of the first type of value
�/span> possibly incommensurable values
though would still be able to make simple pair-wise comparisons
but if moral, rather than prudential, deliberations:
� demands on measurement
the question is not:
Are interpersonal comparisons of
well-being possible?
since some obviously are
the question is:
Are comparisons possible on the best conception for prudential/moral reasoning?
and:
Can we make enough of them, and will
they be reliable enough, for the policy of maximising to be a practical
proposition?
the answer to this depends on what the best conception is
the broad conception of prudential value theory = more difficult
Will
our measurement match our needs?
1. do incommensurabilities occur?
2. if so, where?
3. how do they affect measurement?
4. what sort of measurement is possible/needed in the one person case?
5. what are interpersonal comparisons like?
6. how feasible are they in the practical setting in which our deliberation has to take place?
value:
prudential values = what makes a person�s own life valuable to him
the �good� in contrast to the �right�
moral values =� the �right� as well as the �good
anything �normative� rather than merely �descriptive���������
incommensurable:
strong =� two items cannot be compared quantitatively at all
cannot be fitted onto any scale of measurement (though the scales themselves can be ranked from weak to strong)
perhaps values can be commensurable depending on how demanding the scale is
weak =��� no amount of one sort of item can equal, in respect of some quantity, a certain amount of another
cardinal -
the cardinal numerals, points, virtues, etc.
cardinal number, cardinal numeral - any of the positive whole numbers,
one, two, three, etc., showing how many elements there are in a certain set
ordinal - marking position in an order or series
ordinal number,
ordinal numeral s.v. ordinal a. 2); any of a series of analogous transfinite
numbers.